Comparison of SSL/TLS Protocol Versions Using a Fixed Table
At the top of the screen of this tool, a fixed comparison table summarizing the specifications and recommendation levels for six major communication standards from SSL 2.0 to TLS 1.3 is placed.
As information for confirming the transition of encrypted communication protocols, the release year, the corresponding standard (RFC) number, and major functional features are displayed in a panel format.
For example, for SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0, which were designed in the 1990s and are now completely deprecated, a red label of "Extremely Dangerous / Completely Deprecated" is attached as the status, and flaws at the protocol design level are explained.
In addition, regarding TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, which were once widely used, the historical background of being deprecated and abolished by RFC 8996 is described, so that it can be visually confirmed that they should not be used in new configurations.
On the other hand, for TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), which is currently mainly used, and TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446), the latest standard, design features such as hash function support using SHA-256 and speedup by 1-RTT handshake are shown in bullet points.
This comparison table is an output of a fixed database, and does not have the function for the user to specify a specific network or server and dynamically diagnose the current protocol support status.
It functions merely as a learning interface for checking as text why past standards were deprecated and what improvements the latest standards incorporate.
Input of Cipher Suite Name and Decomposition of Configuration Algorithm
Within the cipher suite judgment simulator section, when an operator enters an OpenSSL or IETF identifier string, a client-side routine decomposes its constituent cryptographic parameters for display.
As text is provided in the input field, the browser evaluates the value strictly after applying uppercase normalization and trimming whitespace.
Under this finite known-name policy adapted from the Japanese edition, the parser references a precise set of thirteen registered spellings (representing eleven distinct cipher suites alongside two standard IANA aliases).
Rather than querying the exhaustive global IANA registry or deploying a loose substring extractor, the implementation maps only these exact registered naming conventions into four structural roles: key exchange algorithm (KEX), authentication mechanism (Auth), symmetric cipher algorithm (Enc), and message integrity or hash specification.
For example, recognizing an input corresponding to an AES-GCM cipher suite results in presenting its symmetric role as Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption (AEAD).
This entire operation takes place locally as static string analysis inside the browser engine; it never transmits text strings across the network to external validation endpoints or performs active server handshakes.
Consequently, recognizing a known spelling serves only as an educational reference decomposition for the provided identifier and does not inspect server environments, validate live deployment configurations, or verify peer certificates.
Finite Known-Name Matching and Reference Security Classifications
Following the identification of a registered cipher suite name, this interface supplies a static reference security classification derived strictly from the recognized algorithm combination.
The evaluation logic explicitly rejects heuristic keyword scanning: unregistered strings, malformed syntax, or custom PSK-derived variants like junk_AES_128_GCM are categorically designated as unknown, completely avoiding invented assessments of secure or weak.
For supported known names, the displayed rating provides a historical and contextual reference rather than an active service guarantee.
For instance, legacy suites containing RC4, 3DES (such as DES-CBC3-SHA), or MD5 (such as RC4-MD5) are marked as insecure due to established cryptographic breaks.
Known static RSA key-transport suites, such as AES128-SHA, lack forward secrecy (PFS) and rely on legacy CBC or SHA-1 constructs, warranting caution or weak reference ratings.
In contrast, modern TLS 1.2 suites explicitly define their roles: ECDHE-RSA denotes ephemeral ECDH key exchange with RSA certificate authentication, while DHE-RSA denotes ephemeral finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
The resulting visual indicators reflect established cryptographic consensus regarding these specific registered names, but they never assess actual server implementations, enforce organizational compliance, or measure real-world cipher resilience under live network conditions.
TLS 1.3 Architectural Decoupling and Exact Specification Handling
In the cipher suite identification workflow, identifiers complying with TLS 1.3 diverge substantially from earlier protocol conventions.
The system recognizes solely three standardized TLS 1.3 names: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.
In the TLS 1.3 architecture, key exchange mechanisms and authentication schemes are intentionally removed from the cipher suite naming convention.
The cipher suite designation specifies exclusively the bulk authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm and the companion HKDF hash algorithm, while key establishment is negotiated independently.
Accordingly, the tool avoids making fixed guesses or unwarranted assumptions such as presupposing Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or inferring certificate types.
In the case of TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, the Poly1305 primitive acts as the AEAD authenticator tag while SHA-256 serves as the HKDF hash, rather than operating as an HMAC record MAC.
Furthermore, TLS 1.3 architectures support pre-shared key (PSK-only) modes that may operate without forward secrecy, and 0-RTT early data transitions remain inherently susceptible to replay threats under specific network conditions.
The tool highlights these technical distinctions purely for reference without evaluating live protocol transactions.
Introduction of Historical Attacks and Functional Differences from Current Status Diagnostic Tools
Along with the evolution of protocols, dictionary data regarding major SSL/TLS vulnerabilities is displayed at the bottom of the screen of this tool.
Fixed text information summarizing the discovery year, target protocols and environments, and an overview of the attacks is expanded for five historically impactful attack methods: POODLE, Heartbleed, BEAST, CRIME / BREACH, and Sweet32.
For example, regarding POODLE, it explains that it exploits a flaw in the padding verification design of the CBC mode of block ciphers in SSL 3.0, and for Heartbleed, it explains that it is caused by a lack of memory boundary verification in the OpenSSL library rather than the protocol design itself.
This information is provided as reference material to show how past failures in formulating cryptographic communication specifications have been utilized in the design of subsequent versions.
As a functional difference to note, this tool does not have any active inspection features to execute a vulnerability scan against the website of a specified URL, or to diagnose at the packet level whether the current browser connection is vulnerable to these attacks.
It is necessary to use it keeping in mind that it is merely rendering explanatory text defined as fixed array data on the UI, and is not a tool that automatically performs effective risk evaluation in the user's network environment.
String Processing Within the Browser and Matters to Confirm Separately in the Actual Environment
The display of cryptographic protocol information and the decomposition and classification processing of the entered cipher suite names on this page are designed to be completed entirely within the browser by JavaScript executed on the user's device.
The process of receiving the string entered into the form as the target for analysis and updating the state of the UI components is performed using local computing resources.
Even if you type a cipher suite name into the input form, no new API communication with the server will occur for its analysis. However, labels such as "secure" or "recommended" displayed on the screen are nothing more than a reference classification based on the composition of the input string and fixed protocol information.
The security of communications in actual web services and infrastructure depends on a wide variety of factors, not just the cipher suite configuration expressed as a string, but also the version of the server software, the validity of configuration files, and the expiration date and key length of digital certificates.
Since this tool does not have the function to obtain and verify the parameters of these actual environments, it cannot be judged that the security of the system is guaranteed based solely on the output results.
In order to build and maintain a secure communication environment in practice, it is required to refer to official guidelines such as RFC 9325 and separately conduct operational checks of the actual server and configuration verification using specialized diagnostic tools.